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AND THE 
This part of From Newton's Sleep, 
published by Princeton University 
Press in 1995 and in a paperback 
edition in early 1997, is reprinted 
by permission of the publisher. 
From Newton's Sleep is a book on 
the legal form of thought and its 
meaning for science and religion. 
It consists of some two hundred and 
fifty self-contained pieces arranged 
in eight sections. In its form, the 
book is much like and is meant to 
be much like the material with 
which lawyers routinely deal. Here, 
Law Quadrangle Notes excerpts a 
piece that touches on a subject of 
lively debate today, among 
practitioners and legal scholars 
both - the nature of criminal law 
and in particular its application to 
economic organizations. This 
excerpt, "Corporate Crime," is 
from Section VII of the book, "The 
Expression of Responsibility: On the 
Organizational in Legal Thought. " 
- BY Jo EPH VINING 
OF MONEY 
The application of the criminal law to 
business corporations has one overriding 
function. It counters, as can nothing else, 
the temptation to define the purpose of the 
corporate entity as the maximization of 
money profit. 
Purpose pervades all aspects of the legal 
analysis of entities. It governs legal 
decisions on the capacities of individuals, 
whether when they act they act for the 
entity It governs individuals' decisions 
whether to act when acting for the entity 
As a purpose, profit maximization 
externalizes all alue and translates all 
decision into calculation of advantage, 
introducing the implacable into an already 
competitive world and rendering law itself, 
law that conceives the entity and continues 
to make it conceivable, an object not just 
of some manipulation but total 
manipulation. 
Always in the air of thought, a playful 
postulate of political, economic, and 
biological theory alike, profit maximization 
is only of real moment in law in analysis of 
business corporations, which are not, 
analytically or as a matter of fact, 
themselves agents of decision-making 
individuals. The temptation to profit 
maximization is handled routinely in the 
human breast; it appears so rarely in pure 
form in individuals that its appearance is 
marked as a sign of disintegration and 
insanity The cycle of life and the looming 
of death are alone usually sufficient to 
dissolve it. But it can be abstracted out and 
given to a corporate entity, and the life of 
the corporate entity can be insulated from 
the natural cycle of the life of an 
individual. Thus entry of criminal law; and 
of a criminal law, moreover, unstained by 
the bloody rope or the twisted flesh of 
the prison. 
Criminal law is the internalization of 
value. There is no crime in any set of facts , 
no matter how much hurt there is in 
them, unless there is a criminal state of 
mind. Causing death is common, murder 
is not; what distinguishes death from 
murder is mind. The criminal state of 
mind, raised as a possibility by the 
applicability of the criminal law, is 
precisely the externalization of value 
defined and protected by the criminal law, 
calculation as to value, manipulation of it, 
coldness toward it - precisely the 
state of mind contemplated for the 
profit-maximizing decision maker. 
Prescription drug safety or worker 
safety are not achieved by simple 
prohibitions but by ingenious devices and 
institutional design. The criminal penalties 
that appear in connection with 
prescription drugs or worker safety ha e 
another function, which is to speak to the 
agent of the entity who is asking, "V hat is 
my duty, how am I to think about a tions 
I may take on behalf of the entity?" and t 
speak to the lawyer for the entity, advising 
agents of the entity in the large and in the 
particular. What is spoken and said is that 
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for the business corporation and agents 
thereof, as for individuals in other 
ituations in social life , substanti e alues 
are ultimatel to figure in decision as such 
and in and for themselves, and are not, 
ultimately, matters of indifference to be left 
entirely to the concern of others. 
That this needs particularly to be 
declared in corporate law gives reason for 
applying the criminal law more broadly to 
corporations than to individuals. And the 
reasons for real hesitation in invoking the 
criminal law - the awful pain of its 
penalties against the body, the petty 
tyranny of its application to the weak and 
poor, the depressi e effect of its threats in 
the psychology of everyday life, which is 
of ten named an interference with liberty or 
with the sense of freedom - have not the 
same force when the potential defendant is 
a corporate entity The vagueness endemic 
to the criminal law in the specification of 
what is or is not to be done becomes less a 
defect, more a protection of its efficacy 
against a calculating mentality, including 
that of the litigating lawyer. 
Ne t to this , this declarative and 
structuring function, the penalties and 
sanctions criminal law brings to bear are of 
secondary importance. Criminal law is 
internal to corporate law, part of the 
defining and enabling that corporate law 
and lawyers are engaged in - the 
instituting of the modem economy, its very 
peopling. Criminal law does not swoop in 
from the outside to affect what has already 
been set in motion. Certainly there is 
deterrence in some sanctions; but in the 
absence of pain, and with fines set as for 
individuals, or set with attention to their 
effect on individuals who are dependent 
on the corporation, the consequences of 
criminal conviction have historically been 
scoffed at and bundled into cost-benefit 
formulas . Recent developments, attaching 
civil liability to criminal conviction and 
multiplying civil damages by some 
punitive factor, introducing supervisi?n (as 
in probation or other semi-incarceranve 
measures for individuals) , and, above all, 
conditioning corporate continuation in 
licensed activities on "fitness" and 
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" haracter ' (to which criminal conviction 
has always been thought to speak where 
individuals are involved), have made the 
actual outcomes of actual criminal 
prosecutions factors to be reckoned with 
by corporate decision makers. And the 
criminal law can work, in this sense. 
Decisions about its scope, appropriateness, 
and application are not troubled by any 
real fear of its impotence where corporations 
are involved. 
But each development in the 
effectiveness of the sanctions that are 
directed at corporate entities meets the 
web of dependencies that surround the 
corporate entity and with which the entity 
itself may be identified. These filaments of 
connection are usually of such extent that 
they cannot be ignored, as the family of 
the individual convict is ignored; and 
increasing sensitivity to systemic effects 
generally, economic or ecological, has 
made the unintended and undesirable side 
effects of corporate sanctions factors to be 
reckoned with by public decision makers. 
It is thus in another sense that the criminal 
law works, where corporations are 
involved: before sanctions, addressing the 
very nature of decision making on behalf 
of corporations, speaking to what factors 
are to be taken into account and with what 
weight and what factors are not to be 
taken into account, what good faith 
consists of, what is authorized and what is 
not, and touching moreover all those 
further organizational and institutional 
decisions that determine whether a 
substantive determination will be 
implemented - what is to be taken to 
another level in decision-making structures, 
or what is cause for dissociation, or what is 
disclosable and what not, or what is 
defensible in preventive, protective, and 
self-protective activity 
Analytically there are other ways to 
address these questions, and they are 
addressed at other places in corporate law. 
If the interests of those holding securities 
entitling them to participate in some way 
in the equity left on liquidation (at the end 
of the corporations activities) are to be 
focused upon with special prominence in 
corporate decision making during 
corporate life, then there can be 
exploration in legal argument of what 
those interests are and how, when they 
conflict, they are to be weighed or 
sought. If the uni erse of such interests is 
not the sole focus, there can be 
exploration of what other groups, from 
employees to customers, ar to be 
admitted into the category of those 
whos claims are not costs to be 
minimized, and exploration of how their 
interests and claims are to be defined. 
Analytically these interests, groups, or 
claims are often surrogates for values 
protected by the criminal law, and might 
enter the thinking of corporate agents 
with much the same life and sense of 
right. But such democratic or 
communitarian capitalism is yet inchoate 
and may remain so for as many centuries 
as the problems of organizational law 
have so far persisted. 
From the earliest time corporations 
have arguably been subject to the 
criminal law; certainly through this 
century they have. In the broadest frame 
of reference, what is irrational and a 
stumbling block to those who are sure 
they know what the corporate entity is, 
may, for the empirical, be critical 
evidence of the place of entity in the 
mind and, indeed, the nature of the 
person created by each individual. 
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